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Things are often not what they seem, however, and once European governments became aware of the very real political and economic costs of "wanting what the United States now wants," they balked, and the power of the new "One-Ring" began to fail. This has resulted in a growing divergence between the type of political economy many European governments still want (equalitarian and compensatory) versus that now sought by the United States (inegalitarian and nonaccommodating); and such divergence constitutes part of why the United States and Europe are growing apart today.
To make this case, the first part of this chapter sketches out the ideas that underpinned U. S. power between 1945 and 1975 . This order was based on a specific version of "the way the economic world works" born in the Great Depression. The global acceptance of these ideas made American power in this period extremely robust since it successfully portrayed the particular interests of the United States as being the general interest of Europe. The next part of this chapter details why some groups in the United States found this order to be not in their best interests, and discusses how they overturned it, as detailed by Teles and Kenny (in Chapter 5) , using neoliberal ideas. I then discuss how these ideas came to Europe, and detail the transformations they wrought during the 1980s and the 1990s.
The next part of the chapter argues that although the construction of common interests by the United States was possible in both periods, the neoliberal ideas underlying the current order make for a much more fragile compact -one that many European governments are unwilling to join. To substantiate these claims, comparisons are made between the United States and Europe in the areas of economic performance, welfare policies, and inequality. We find that there is indeed increasing divergence 5 between the United States and Europe in terms of economic policies and outcomes, and I question the extent to which Europe is really "going neoliberal."
Although European leaders were willing to embrace the first compact given the positive-sum nature of the outcomes they offered, the more that the economic and social costs generated by the current order became apparent, the less they were willing to adhere to the second neoliberal compact. Consequently, what we increasingly see is European governments "talking a good game" regarding neoliberal policies while in fact doing something quite different in practice. If U.S. strength were based merely on brute force, this incongruence would be of little consequence, but it is not. To return to the dark lord Sauron, deprived of the ability to bind men together with a common conception of "what we all want," what could be termed "Mao's revenge" may begin to affect U.S. intereststhat is, "if you can't make someone want what you want, you may have to stick a gun in their face."
iii The costs of doing so, however, may ultimately prove to be very high The need for such a new form of capitalism was as much political as it was economic. On the economic front, postwar planners believed that the reason fascism came to power in Europe in the 1930s was that when the world economy deflated in the Great Depression, the costs of deflation (falling prices) were borne for over a decade mainly by labor in the form of declining wages and higher unemployment. This was allowed to occur since, according to the economic ideas of the 1920s and 1930s, deflation was a series of shocks to the global economy that would ride themselves out through the adjustment of wages and prices; if the price mechanism wwas allowed to operate without the well-meaning but ultimately harmful interference of government. If there was unemployment, it had to be the result of labor bargaining for too high a wage; to restore balance, wages had to fall to match prices. Cushioning adjustment would simply pile on the pain and delay the inevitable.
There were unfortunately two problems with such a view. First, if it was correct, adjustment costs were still shouldered by labor, and what the 1930s seemed to show was that labor, wherever it was located, did not respond well to precipitous drops in the real wage.
v Second, such a theory simply could not explain why between 1924 and 1931 7 millions of people across the world seemed to decide that the prevailing wage in their job was too low and that an extended unpaid vacation was in order. Indeed, the poverty and upheaval caused by the Great Depression made the claim that unemployment was voluntary seem quite absurd. As far as the postwar world was concerned, then, a simple return to the status quo ante, where the external financial balance automatically governed internal wages, prices, and employment levels, was not going to suffice.
B-Head Rethinking the Way the World Works
In terms of governing ideas, the critical lesson learned from the Great Depression was that unemployment persisted not because people were unwilling to work at the prevailing wage, but because there was no work to be had; unemployment could be involuntary.
These new ideas stressed that the reason economic depressions were so difficult to get out of was that investors were depressed -in a very specific sense. The new idea was that although investors and investment (the supply side of the economy) ultimately create jobs and growth, investors tended to have rather short-sighted expectations regarding the future. vi If investors think that the past three months were bad, and the three months before that were bad, then regardless of the preceding twenty months of bliss, they will probably think that the next three months will also be bad. The result is that, quite rationally but perversely, individual investors are unwilling to invest, with the consequence that economic activity as a whole declines, despite this being the very outcome that everyone wants to avoid.
To cap it all off, if the distribution of income and wealth is highly unequal (as it was in most countries during the 1930s), then investors do not need to invest to survive 8 given the disproportionate amount of income and wealth they already hold. Labor, on the other hand, cannot have wages without investment, and without wages fascism and communism lay just around the corner. Seen in this way, something had to be done to give a shock to the system and stimulate investment. That something was government.
These new ideas proposed that boosting demand through spending would raise consumption, signaling to investors that prices were rising, thereby encouraging investment: Interference became intervention.
vii Some investors, suspicious of the government, argued that this was government trickery, since any spending now would be paid for in the form of higher interest rates (or taxes) in the future due to the government squandering available investment; or it would ruin business confidence, the very thing that government was trying to encourage.
However, if investors' expectations were indeed "front-loaded," then raising prices through government spending would create a situation where investors could make money. All investors would then be faced with a choice: Hold out in principled opposition to government policy, or make money (since clearly someone else could), thus expanding the economy and reversing the self-fulfilling dynamic of investor expectations through the raising of prices. of "the way the world works," investors and entrepreneurs were the heroes. As liberal theorists from Adam Smith onward argued, savings led to investment, which led to wages to buy the products made by the workers themselves, which led to profits reinvested in the firm. In short, investment led to income, which led to investment -a virtuous circle.
But in the 1930s, the virtuous circle broke down and the new ideas previously discussed came to prominence. But what is not often noted in discussions of the rise of these new ideas was the distributionary politics that they necessarily enshrined.
As discussed previously, these new ideas deemed that the key to encouraging investment was rising prices, and saw the government as being able to raise prices via spending. But in the long run such a position suggests something quite political: that consumption drives investment, not the opposite. Under these new ideas, the demand side, not the supply side, is seen as dominant. In such a world, consumers become heroes -not investors -and in making this change, political power becomes redistributed. The idea behind the Phillips curve was that there existed a trade-off between the rate of change in wages and the general level of prices (more prosaically, unemployment versus inflation). This curve seemed to offer policy makers a menu of choice between the two outcomes, trading one off against the other, which was nice; but it also had some rather unsettling distributional implications. For example, if the party that benefited most from these new ideas (that which represented the majority of the income distribution, the Democrats) preferred to trade off a little more inflation against a little more unemployment, then to the extent that inflation is a tax on time-deferred investment incomes, that tax would be paid by the Republican Party's most powerful constituency -14 the investor class. Friedman helped to portray this as a disaster waiting to happen, not just for the investor class, but for everyone.
B-Head Neoliberal Lesson #1: Activism Is Harmful to Your Health
To turn this particular redistribution into a general disaster, Friedman made four assumptions that today form (with some modification; two were added later) the core of contemporary neoliberal thinking:
1. There is a "natural" rate of unemployment beyond which the economy cannot be pushed.
2. Job seekers and investors have "adaptive" rather than shortsighted expectations.
3. In the long run, there is no trade-off between employment and inflation.
Unemployment is voluntary.
xvi These assumptions enabled Friedman to tell the following story.
Imagine you live in an economy with a level of unemployment that is seen as "too high" and a government that wants to do something about it. According to the Phillips curve, it can do so by spending money to increase prices, signaling investment, and tightening labor markets, all of which would be reflected in higher wages that would encourage the unemployed to return to work (since their current unemployment is voluntary -assumption 4). This would trigger still higher prices, as the Phillips curve predicted, which would bring forth new growth. The problem, Friedman insisted, was that this trade-off between unemployment and inflation is an illusion, since workers had "adaptive" and not shortsighted expectations (assumption 2).
Unemployed workers would take the new job at the seemingly higher wage, only to discover that prices have also risen. Therefore, although their money wage had increased, their real wage (money wage minus the price level) would not have risen at all.
Workers would then withdraw their labor (assumption 4) such that unemployment returns to its "natural rate" (assumption 1). If the government tries to do this again, it does so from a higher baseline of inflation (assumption 2), and once the price increases filter through the economy, workers again withdraw their labor and unemployment rises, and all that the state is left with is higher and higher inflation and the same rate of unemployment (assumption 1). The take-home message is clear: Government causes inflation -not greater employment.
Despite resting upon some rather heroic assumptions, the timing of this argument was perfect. Coming on the heels of Vietnam War expenditures, the 1960s' welfare expansion, rising deficits, and the November 1973 oil shock, the Phillips curve broke down with unemployment and inflation rising together to produce "Stagflation."
Although this phenomenon was actually quite explicable in terms of Keynesian ideas, If this is the case, and these agents know that in the past the government has expressed a preference for lower unemployment, then they can reasonably expect the government to spend money to lower unemployment. But if spending now means either higher interest rates or higher taxes later on, then such "rational" investors will alter their budgets to compensate before the policy comes into effect, thereby nullifying the its effect on real variables. In other words, policy becomes futile. However, knowing that investors would do this, the government could try and spend unexpectedly, in an effort to get around the anticipated reactions of investors. Doing so would interfere with the otherwise efficient price signals of markets, thus causing confusion and thereby bringing about a recession. Government was therefore toxic, or pointless, or both.
The final nail in the coffin of the new economics was supply-side tax theory, a reinvention and reinstatement of the classical view that investment drives income, and not the other way around. xix This "supply-side revolution" was also very effective bribery. As Americans have shown in the past two decades, when faced with a choice between a tax cut and "any other policy," the tax cut wins every time, despite the redistribution being rather obviously skewed toward the top earners. Add all this together, and fund it with lavish press campaigns, television programs, and research grants to sympathetic economists, and the result was to turn the world (neo-) liberal again. fiscal stimulus, at a time when everyone else was deflating, Mitterand's policies produced massive capital flight out of the Franc, which seemed to prove that controls did not work, and a massive appreciation of interest rates that caused the economy to slow even further.
After a year of holding out, the French government executed a famous policy U-Turn and gave up trying to control the franc, the domestic rate of interest, and aggregate demand.
Having "learned" from this, even Sweden, that paragon of social democracy, saw the writing on the wall and in 1987 deregulated its domestic credit markets and abolished exchange controls shortly thereafter.
By the time that the Berlin Wall came down, it seemed that there was indeed "no alternative." This was confirmed further in the 1990s, when right-wing governments lost power and putatively left-wing parties were returned throughout Europe with large majorities. However, as the cases of Tony Blair, Gerhard Schröder, Wim Kok, and Romano Prodi demonstrated, redistribution, higher taxes, and demand-side economics were conspicuous by their absence. In their place these, "left" governments created independent central banks and currency unions. To update Richard Nixon, it seems that "we are all neoliberals now." Appearances, however, can be deceptive. As the costs of pursuing such policies have become more obvious over time, the less European states are willing to bear them. Europe increasingly "talks a good game" about deep neoliberal reform, but in fact does something quite different in practice. It is worth noting that a high employment participation rate and long working hours are often noted as being a good outcome. This is strange, however, when one considers that according to (even neoliberal) economic theory, the richer a country gets, the less it is supposed to work. This is called the labor/leisure trade-off, which the United
States seems determined to ignore. This might also explain why U.S. productivity is held to be so much better than that of Europe -Americans simply work longer. But does that make the United States more efficient, hence making neoliberal outcomes unavoidable?
We often hear that it does, or at least that the United States is more productive than the rest of the world, and that Europe needs to catch up. However, in actual fact, this may not be the case either. xxxix Given these transformations, one must conclude that the Swedish model, and the equality associated with it, has gone out the window. Yet to conclude this would be a mistake.
First of all, as noted previously, in comparison with the United States and the United Kingdom, Sweden's Gini coefficient has hardly moved in the past three decades.
Second, the adoption of neoliberal reforms in countries such as Sweden is in fact much more complicated than the simple "reform -> inequality" equation would allow.
Regarding pensions and unemployment benefits, although changes were made overall, "the generosity of Swedish social security was on average the same in 1998 as in 1980." xl In fact, "the unemployment benefit was [even] more generous [than formerly]." xli Spending on private health and retirement certainly has increased, as has means-tested benefits, which implies more markets and less equality. However, this too is misleading, since the proportion of the population covered by such benefits has actually increased, largely due to immigration. xlii Finally, although taxes were cut in the early 1990s, they were raised again in the latter half of the decade when the regressive nature of such changes became apparent. xliii Once Sweden recovered from the collapse of the early 1990s and began to run a budget surplus in 1998, as well as paying down the national debt, the government increased spending on child support and other benefits. As Prime Minister Goran Persson said, "healthcare, social services and schooling come before tax cuts," xliv and indeed they did, consistently. In sum, although there has certainly been economic reform in Sweden, it is simply not the case that such transformations lead inevitably down the same path as the United States. Despite seemingly neoliberal measures being implemented from early 1990s on, Sweden remains a social democracy with a large public sector, generous social benefits, public services, and low levels of As Thomas Friedman and others have argued, the changes previously detailed are the result of structural and "globalizing" forces beyond the control of any one state. As a consequence, the world is "flat," and unless states adopt neoliberal policies, they will 29 become mired in low growth and unemployment, as evidenced by the larger continental economies, especially Germany and France. Ideas don't matter; economic forces manifest in "the unstoppable freedom and technology train" do.
Although appealing, such a logic, popular though it is, is actually quite overwhelmed by the available evidence. Such an analysis suffers two key failings. First of all, the timing is off. That is, although global forces may be strong today in 2006, they
were not when such claims were being made the most, in the 1980s and 1990s. Quite simply, the numbers don't back up the story, even today. The quantitative effect of such forces leads us to a rather curious "tail wagging the dog" scenario. Second, although
France and especially Germany do have real economic problems, such problems are selfinflicted wounds that have little to do with not adhering to neoliberal ideas. Indeed, it can be shown that when Germany has adhered to such ideas, the result has been to worsen its economic problems.
The issue of timing is important since if the claim is that "globalization made me do it" historically, then the quantitative data simply do not support the argument. One such claim is that competition from East Asia lowered costs and so impacted European labor markets during the 1980s that mass unemployment was the result since strong unions would not allow the necessary wage reductions to compensate. However, as Robert Wade has shown, exports from East Asia to the United States and Europe in the period 1980 to 1990 peaked at 5.5 percent of world trade, which is a case of the tail wagging the dog. In the early 1990s, a similar claim was made so often by presidential candidate Bill Clinton during the 1992 election that "the new global economy" had changed everything, despite the fact that the United States was then, and still is, apart from Japan, the least globalized economy in the world. Taking a standard measure of an economy's openness -that is, one that measures how much consumption GDP is generated by The same story is true of Europe, which has under the auspices of the EU been steadily deglobalizing its trade with the rest of the world while trading more internally.
As Vivien Schmidt has shown, the argument that European states must compete for footloose global foreign direct investment (FDI) or suffer the consequences is likewise well short on the available evidence. In 1998, Germany's inward FDI as a percentage of GDP was 0.9 percent. France's figure was 2 percent. Indeed, both states exported more capital than they imported -2.8 percent and 2 percent of GDP, respectively. xlvii Again, the tail was wagging the dog.
Turning to the second objection, Germany and France in particular do have very real problems with unemployment and slow growth, but this has very little to do with flexibility of labor markets and a lot to do with internal policy choices. Take the case of Germany, the unemployment showcase of Europe. From the mid-1990s until today, its unemployment performance was certainly worse than that of the United States, but it had also just bought, at a hopelessly inflated price, a redundant country of 17 million people persuade European elites to sign on to it. Alliances were built on "common interests" that were instantiated in real gains for all sections of society. Support for this order, and thus for America, was strong. This is why the United States was able to count on its allies in Europe, by and large, pulling in the same direction. To get things done, one did not need to separate "ungrateful old Europe" from the "bribable new Europe." And when those allies disagreed -for example, over Vietnam -the "ties that bound" were strong enough to withstand such strains. Due to these policies and the outcomes they produce, the United States increasingly relies upon unilateral action, military strength, and indicative diplomacy to get its way. As such, it cannot easily count on Europe to support the United States in its foreign and domestic policy goals given that other "ties that bind" no longer bind quite as well. If Europe is discussed at all in American policy circles, it tends to be seen as a bunch of "cheese-eating surrender monkeys" who tax themselves to death, are drowning in a sea of joblessness, and who simply need to be "more like us." lvi Yet where is economic weakness really to be found when you consider the following?
With a few exceptional years in the late 1990s notwithstanding, the United States has been running massive trade and budget deficits for over thirty years. It has also been consuming far beyond its ability to pay for the past twenty. The costs of such policies are huge interest repayments and an almost negative savings rate. To pay for this, the United
States needs to maintain above-average growth and import approximately $2.2 billion in other peoples' savings per day to pay its bills. Add on to this military expenditures larger than half the members of the UN's budgets and a debt "ceiling" of $9 trillion, and it is not clear that this model is actually the sustainable one, particularly with the levels of inequality that it generates.
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Such sentiment is already commonplace. As a consequence of its insatiable demand for imports, China and other East Asian states hold over a U.S. $1 trillion in their foreign exchange holdings. Yet the value of that debt is declining. The dollar fell against the Euro by over 30 percent (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) Meanwhile, the U.S. response to this is to tell China to revalue its exchange rate, which is a little like a crack addict asking the dealer to raise the price so that he can get off drugs.
In the former era would not have caused a panic on the exchanges. In the current era, in a "lean-andmean," go-it-alone world, such solutions are no longer viable. In a neoliberal world, you can't count on your friends.
The take-home lesson is this: When you have all the other countries on your side
because they want what you want, you can do (almost) anything you like at very low cost. However, when the version of "the way the world works" that you are promoting no longer fits the ambitions of your main allies, and there are credible exit options, power can no longer be generated in this way. Like electricity from oil, U.S. power is simply going to cost more to produce. As Iraq clearly shows, when the "One Ring" of common 
